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PRODUCTS LIABILITY- APPLICABILITY

OF COMAPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
TO MISUSE AND ASSUMPTION
OF THE RISK
DAVID
I.

A.

FISCHER*

INTRODUCTION

A trend is emerging to apply comparative negligence in strict products
liability actions.'
This creates two serious difficulties. First is the question of how to compare the negligence of one party with the strict liability of the other party. This problem has been dealt with at length in an
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; B.A. 1965, J.D. 1968,
University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. The following state courts have applied comparative negligence to strict
liability cases. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42
(Alas. 1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Busch v.
Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); General Motors Corp. v.
Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977); Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 64
Wis. 2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393 (1974); Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 63 Wis.
2d 728, 218 N.W.2d 279 (1974); Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1,
186 N.W.2d 258 (1971); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55
(1967). The following federal courts in diversity cases have predicted that the
state whose law was being applied would adopt this approach. Edwards v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975); Rodrigues v. Ripley Indus., Inc.,
506 F.2d 782 (1st Cir. 1974); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp.,
411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F.
Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972); Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Haw. 1961).
See also Pan Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129
(9th Cir. 1977) (admiralty law).
Many authors advocate that comparative negligence be applied in strict liability
actions. Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIR LAW &
CoM. 107 (1976); Feinberg, The Applicability of a Comparative Negligence Defense in
a Strict Products Liability Suit Based on Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d
(Can Oil and Water Mix?), 42 INS. COUNSEL J. 39 (1975); Fisher, Nugent & Lewis,
Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied Justice, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 674
(1974); Fleming, The Supreme Court of California, 1974-75-Foreward: Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239, 270 (1976);
Freedman, The Comparative Negligence Doctrine Under Strict Liability: Defendant's
Conduct Becomes Another "Proximate Cause" of Injury, Damage or Loss, 1975 INS. L.J.
468; Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's Liability in
Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627, 637, 652 (1968); McNichols, The Kirkland v.
General Motors Manufacturer's Products Liability Doctrine-What's in a Name?, 27
ORLA. L. REv. 347, 407 (1974); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory
Negligence and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93, 118 (1972); Phillips, The
Standardfor Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 101,
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earlier article. 2 The second problem is to determine exactly what forms
of plaintiff misconduct may appropriately be used as a basis for reducing
the plaintiff's recovery under comparative negligence principles. This
problem is especially acute where misuse or the assumption of the risk is
involved. Both assumption of the risk and misuse are terms of variable
meaning, and they play a variable role depending in part on the type of
strict liability imposed in a given jurisdiction. Therefore, the extent to
which these factors should mitigate damages may differ significantly
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Even in a comparative negligence system some of this conduct should remain an absolute bar to recovery
while other conduct should not affect the plaintiff's recovery at all. Still
other conduct that falls under the general heading of either misuse or
assumption of the risk is an appropriate basis for reducing the plaintiff's
recovery. The purpose of this article is to identify those situations where
either misuse or assumption of the risk should constitute an absolute
defense, no defense at all, or a basis for reducing the plaintiff's recovery.
II. MISUSE
Product misuse includes abnormal use and mishandling. Abnormal use
is the use of the product for an unintended or unforeseeable purpose.3
Mishandling is the use of the product for an intended purpose but in an
unintended manner. 4 Not all misuse as thus defined prevents the imposition of liability, and a more precise definition that can be universally
applied is not feasible.
Misuse is not a unitary legal principle (like contributory negligence)
which for policy reasons is to be applied consistently in all cases. Rather,
it is a species of conduct that can be relevant to a variety of issues in a

108 (1977); Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV.
171, 178 (1974); Vetri, Products Liability: The Developing Frameworkfor Analysis, 54
ORE. L. REV. 293, 314 n.99 (1975); Wade, Crawford & Ryder, Comparative Fault
in Tennessee Tort Actions: Past, Present and Future, 41 TENN. L. REV. 423, 452-53,
460 (1974).
2. Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative Neglicence, 43 Mo. L.
REV. 431 (1978). The solution suggested in that article is to reduce the plaintiff's
recovery in proportion to the degree of his own fault. That is, compare the
plaintiff's conduct with how he should have conducted himself (the objective
standard of the reasonable man) and reduce his recovery according to how much
he was at fault. The determination that the jury makes here is the same as under
traditional comparative negligence except that the comparison is made between
one unreasonable person (plaintiff) and one reasonable person (hypothetical)
rather than between two unreasonable people (plaintiff and defendant).
3. Noel, supra note 1, at 95-96; Note, Plaintiff Misconduct as a Defense in
Products Liability, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 189, 195 (1975).
4. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 668-69 (4th ed. 1971);
Note, supra note 3, at 195.
HeinOnline -- 43 Mo. L. Rev. 644 1978

A .u

1978]

MISUSE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK

645

products liability case. Under certain circumstances such conduct can
negate various elements of the plaintiff's case, such as the existence of
defect or of proximate cause. In this sense misuse is not an affirmative
defense. Rather, the plaintiff must prove "normal use" of the product in
order to establish the elements of a cause of action. 5 If misuse does
not negate an element of the plaintiff's case it is relevant only if the
conduct constitutes a recognized affirmative defense.
In situations where misuse negates an element of plaintiff's case it
should be a complete bar to recovery. Comparative negligence is not
appropriate. 6 Apportioning damages in such cases is comparable to apportioning the failure of the plaintiff to prove a touching in a battery
case. It is unthinkable to permit the plaintiff even a diminished recovery
in such circumstances, because he has not proven an essential element of
his case.
Furthermore, apportioning damages based on the kind of misuse that
negates the existence of defect or causation could in two situations lead
to full recovery by the plaintiff. First, misuse would not mitigate damages at all if it is reasonable. Assume the plaintiff attaches pontoons to
his automobile and attempts to use it as a raft. He would be reasonable
if this appeared necessary to save a life. Yet surely the manufacturer
should not be liable for making an unseaworthy automobile. This problem can arise in any case where the plaintiff's interest is sufficiently
great to outweigh the gravity of the harm threatened and there are no
viable alternatives open to him. Second, even if misuse by the user or
consumer is unreasonable this misconduct would not preclude a bystander from recovering his full damages from the manufacturer. Thus,
if in using a soda bottle as a hammer a third party is injured by the
flying glass, under a comparative negligence standard the manufacturer
have to pay for the failure of the soda bottle to be a suitable
would still
7
hammer.

5. Noel, supra note 1, at 96; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 172-73; Note, supra
note 3, at 195, 197, 200, 204.
6. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977); Schwartz,
supra note 1, at 172-74.
7. Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D.
Idaho 1976). The court indicates that unforeseeable misuse by the plaintiff will
be a basis for reducing the plaintiff's recovery unless the misuse is a superseding
cause of the injury, in which event it will bar all recovery. Under this approach
misuse cannot be used to negate the existence of a defect, but it can prevent the
defendant's conduct from being a proximate cause of the harm. It is not clear
what test of proximate cause the court would use. Under Idaho law foreseeability
is the test for determining whether intervening misconduct constitutes a superseding cause. Mico Mobile Sales and Leasing, Inc., v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho
408, 546 P.2d 54 (1975). If this test were literally applied all unforeseeable misuse would constitute a superseding cause.
HeinOnline -- 43 Mo. L. Rev. 645 1978
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In situations where misuse does not negate an element of plaintiff's
case it may sometimes be desirable to use the conduct as a basis for
reducing the plaintiff's recovery rather than as constituting a complete
bar. Other times misuse will neither negate the existence of an element
of the plaintiff's case nor otherwise constitute a recognized affirmative
defense, and should have no bearing on the outcome of the case.

A. Negating Defect
In order to identify when misuse is relevant solely because it negates
the existence of defect it is necessary to examine the definition of defect.
Various jurisdictions have adopted different criteria for determining
when a product is defective. A specific instance of abnormal use or mishandling might negate the existence of defect in one jurisdiction but not
in another because of a difference in the definition of defect. In the
former jurisdiction, the conduct would be the basis for a complete bar to
recovery while in the latter jurisdiction it would merely be a basis for
diminishing the plaintiff's recovery.
All courts agree that a product must be defective before strict liability
is imposed for the harm it causes. This requirement prevents manufacturers from becoming insurers for all harm resulting from the use of
their products. In addition, many courts have adopted the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, Section 402A 8 as a basis for imposing strict products
liability. The agreement ends here. There is considerable difference of
opinion as to what constitutes a defect, even among jurisdictions purporting to apply the Restatement.
1. Restatement Test
The starting point for determining what constitutes a defect is the Restatement itself. It establishes a two-part test for determining whether a
product is defective. Both parts of the test must be met in order for the
product to be deemed defective.
The Restatement makes clear that a primary effect of misuse is to
negate the existence of defect. A comment in the Restatement provides
that "[a] product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption." 9 Thus, "the seller is not liable if the
injury results from abnormal handling.., or from abnormal consumption ....,,0 It will become clear after examining both aspects of the
Restatement tests of defect that misuse can prevent either from being
met.
8. See (1977) 1 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 4070 for a list of jurisdictions accepting the doctrine.
9. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment h (1965) thereinafter
.cited as. RESTATEMENT].
10. Id.
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The first part of the two-pronged test of defect is known as the consumer expectations test. This test requires that the product be "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics." 11 This test is designed to
prevent frustration of consumers' expectations resulting from hidden or
unexpected dangers related to the use of products. Regardless of the
magnitude of the danger involved, recovery is precluded if the danger 14is
13
or has adequately been warned agairist.
obvious, 12 generally known,
Misuse can negate the existence of defect on the basis that consumer
expectations have not been violated. For example, suppose the plaintiff
uses a soda bottle to hammer a nail into a board and is injured by flying
glass when the bottle breaks. 15 Plaintiff is precluded from recovering
for his injuries, not because of an affirmative defense, but because he
can not prove that the bottle was defective.' 6 A primary test of defect is
the failure of a product to meet consumer expectations as to safety.
Since a reasonable consumer would not expect a soda bottle to be safe
for use as a hammer, expectations are not violated and the product is
not defective. The Oregon Court has expressly recognized the relationship between misuse and the consumer expectations test of defect. It has
held that misuse bars recovery only if it is "so unusual that the average
consumer could not reasonably expect the product to be designed and
manufactured to withstand it-a use which the seller, therefore, need
7
not anticipate and provide for." 1
The second part of the Restatement test is that in addition to violating
consumer expectations, the product must be "unreasonably dangerous"
to the user or consumer. Comment k amplifies the meaning of the unreasonably dangerous requirement by providing an exception to strict
liability for "unavoidably unsafe" products. A product is unavoidably unsafe if it is incapable of being made safe and yet may justifiably be marketed because the utility of the product outweighs the gravity of the
harm threatened. Such products are not deemed defective or unreasonably dangerous. The net effect is that if the plaintiff contends that the
product is defective in design, in addition to showing that the danger

11. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402A, comment i.
12. E.g., Maas v. Dreher, 10 Ariz. App. 520, 460 P.2d 191 (1969); Denton v.
Bachtold Brothers, Inc., 8 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 291 N.E.2d 229 (1972). Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 274
(1969).
13. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402A, comment i.
14. Id., comments h and j.
15. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 172-73.

16. Id.
17. Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265 Ore. 300, 303, 509 P.2d 28, 31
(1973).
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was hidden, he must show that it was either technologically feasible to
design the product in a safer manner or that the marketing of the product as designed was not justifiable because the gravity of the harm
threatened by the product outweighed the utility of its use. Thus there
may be no liability in the case of "unavoidably unsafe" products, even if
the danger is hidden and the product would be defective under the consumer expectations test.
Misuse can also negate the existence of defect on the basis that the
product is not "unreasonably dangerous." Suppose the plaintiff uses a
soda bottle which contains no physical flaw as a container in which to
bury his money. Continual freezing and thawing of the ground cause
the bottle to break, and the money is destroyed by moisture in the
ground. Even assuming that consumer expectations are violated because
reasonable consumers would not expect the bottle to break under such
circumstances, the product is not defective. Under Comment k of the
Restatement the product is unavoidably unsafe. It is not economically
feasible to make a glass soda bottle which will not break under such
circumstances, and the utility of using such containers for soda outweighs the gravity of harm resulting to the plaintiff in the example. Use
of the soda bottle for a hammer renders the product not unreasonably
dangerous for the same reasons. Of course, it is technologically possible
to produce a soda container that is safe for use both as a hammer and
an underground vault; however, the container manufacturer is not required by reasonable care to produce a product suitable for such purposes.
Failure to warn is a possible alternative theory of liability in such cases.
If plaintiff's use of the soda bottle to bury his money is reasonably
foreseeable, the manufacturer would have to give an adequate warning
against such use. 18 However, in the case where the soda bottle is used
as a hammer no warning against such use is necessary because the
danger is generally known and a warning would serve no useful purpose.' 9 Thus, as long as consumer expectations are not foreseeably violated, either because the shortcoming of the product is obvious or has
been warned against, there is no liability because the product is not defective.
The analytical framework for determining whether to apply comparative negligence to misuse in a Restatement jurisdiction can be illustrated
with the following example. Assume the plaintiff uses the defendant's
lighter fluid to clean parts, and is made ill because of the toxic fumes the
fluid emits. Under the Restatement test the product is defective only if it
violates consumer expectations and is also unreasonably dangerous. If
the danger is generally known, the product is not defective and the
18. REsTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402A, comment h.
19. Id. at comment j.
HeinOnline -- 43 Mo. L. Rev. 648 1978
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plaintiff is barred from recovery because the first aspect of the Restatement test is not met. Assuming the danger is not generally known, consumer expectations have been violated. However, the lighter fluid is not
defective unless it is also unreasonably dangerous. Since the danger in
the example is caused by the design of the product, the product is unreasonably dangerous only if it was unreasonably designed or if the
manufacturer unreasonably failed to give an appropriate warning. Assuming no such lack of care the product is not defective and the plaintiff
should be completely barred from recovery. Comparative negligence is
not appropriate. If the product is unreasonably dangerous it would be
appropriate to apply comparative negligence to the plaintiff's misuse. If
the plaintiff's misuse was unreasonable, his damages would be mitigated
accordingly.
A dispute exists as to whether foresight or hindsight should be used to
determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous in its design.
One interpretation of the Restatement scheme is that strict liability is
limited to dangerous manufacturing flaws that violate consumer expectations. In the case of improper design which creates unexpected dangers,
the Restatement imposes liability only if the design was negligently
adopted,

20

or if the manufacturer had negligently failed to warn. 2 1 This

interpretation is consistent with the view of Dean Prosser 22 who was the
Reporter for the Restatement at the time section 402A was adopted. It is
also consistent with the law of products liability as of 1965, the date of

20. Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr.
890 (1973); Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. App. 1973); W.
PROSSER, supra note 4, at 644, 659; 2 L. FRUMER AND M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, § 16A [f], [i]; 3 Id. § 33.02[4], p. 328; Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 587, 632 (1969); Kissel, Defenses to
Strict Liability, 60 ILL. B.J. 450, 461-64 (1972); Polelle, The Foreseeability Concept
and Strict Products Liability: The Odd Couple of Tort Law, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 101,
110-11 (1976); Powell and Hill, Proof of Defect or Defectiveness, 5 U. BALT. L. REV.
77, 81, 100 (1975); Note, Products Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement of
Torts, 55 GEO. L.J. 286, 303, 317-18 (1966); Comment, Reasonable Product Safety:
Giving Content to the Defectiveness Standard in CaliforniaStrict Products Liability Cases,
10 U.S.F. L. REV. 492, 506-07 (1976); Note, Torts-Strict Liability-Automobile
Manufacturer Liable for Defective Design That Enhanced Injury After Initial Accident,
24 VAND. L. REV. 862, 866 n.37 (1971). See also Boisfontaine, Products LiabilityAn Overview, 20 LA. B.J. 269, 271 (1973).
21. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121
(9th Cir. 1968); Oakes v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645,
77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1969); W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 644, 646, 659; Kissel,
supra note 20, at 462-64; Note, 55 GEo. L.J., supra note 19, at 317-18;
Symposium-The State of the Art Defense in Strict Products Liability, 56 MARQ. L.
REV. 649, 658 (1974); Comment, 10 U.S.F. L. REV., supra note 20, at 506-07.
22. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 644-45, 646, 659 nn.72-73, 661.
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23
and with the language of the comments
adoption of the Restatement,
24
Restatement.
the
to

23. Strict tort liability developed from the law of warranty. The Restatement
imposes the same liability for physical harm as that imposed under implied warranty except that the contractual defenses of disclaimer, lack of privity, and lack
of notice are not recognized. E.g., Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d
362, 364 (Mo. 1969); Krauskopf, Products Liability, 32 Mo. L. REV. 459, 469
(1967); Reitz and Seabolt, Warranties and Product Liability: Who Can Sue and
Where?, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 527 (1973); Rheingold, What Are the Consumer's "Reasonable
Expectations"?, 22 Bus. LAW. 589, 589-91 (1967). The implied warranty of merchantability is that the goods are "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used .. " U.C.C. § 2-314(c). This is interpreted to mean "reasonable
fitness" rather than absolute fitness. Keeton, Product Liability and the Automobile, 9
FORUM 1, 7 (1973); Rheingold, supra note 23 at 590 n. 4; Note, The Automobile
Manufacturer's Liability to Pedestriansfor Exterior Design: New Dimensions in
"Crashworthiness", 71 MicH. L. REV. 1654, 1670-71 (1973). Thus, under this

theory there is also no liability for marketing unavoidably unsafe products unless
negligence is shown. Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964);
Hays v. Western Auto Supply Co., 405 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1966). But see Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
24. To avoid liability under the comment k exception, the product involved

must be "properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning....." Restatement, supra note 9, § 402A, comment k. Suppose the manufacturer of a new cold remedy fails to discover that its use creates a risk of ear
infection. If the risk exists because the product was negligently manufactured,
the manufacturer is liable because the drug was not "properly prepared."
Similar reasoning applies in warning cases. Suppose there was no negligence in

manufacture. A failure to warn of the risk of ear infection can render the product defective. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402A, comments j and k. However,
the Restatement expressly provides that the seller must warn only if "he has
knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and
foresight should have knowledge" of the danger. Id., comment j. This is clearly a
test of ordinary negligence. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d
1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Skaggs v. Clairol, Inc., 6
Cal. App. 3d 1, 85 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1970); Oakes v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1969); Kissel, supra note 20, at
462-64; Note, 55 GEO. L.J., supra note 20, at 303; Symposium, supra note 21, at
658; Comment, supra note 20, at 506-07 (1976). Thus, a failure to warn will not
render the product defective unless the manufacturer has been negligent in not
giving a warning. See authorities cited note 21 supra. If follows that there is no
liability for marketing the cold remedy with an unknowable risk of ear infection,
at least if upon later discovery it appears to be a reasonable risk when a proper
warning is given. This is because there has been no negligent failure to warn and
use of the drug is justified because its utility as a cold remedy outweighs the
gravity of harm threatened. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402A, comment k.
Suppose the unknowable risk of ear infection turns out upon discovery to be
unreasonable when compared to the benefit of the product as a cold remedy. Is
the manufacturer liable? The Restatement implies that there is no liability.
Comment k to § 402A applies to new or experimental drugs as to which because
of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience there can be no
assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a
HeinOnline -- 43 Mo. L. Rev. 650 1978
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Acceptance of this interpretation of the Restatement has been mixed.
It is most commonly adhered to in cases involving drugs, 2 5 and some
others reject the interpretacourts adhere to it in all cases. 26 2 However,
7
tion in cases not involving drugs.
The other view of the Restatement scheme is to use hindsight at the
time of trial rather than foresight at the time of manufacture to determine whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous." Knowledge of the
danger and feasible design alternatives as of the date of trial are imputed to the manufacturer, and the product is deemed unreasonably
dangerous if a reasonable manufacturer with such knowledge would not
have marketed the product in the same fashion as the defendant. 28 This
method is used to determine both the adequacy of the design of the
product and of the warning that was or should have been given. This
"hindsight" approach has long been advocated by Professors Wade and
Keeton.2 9 It is becoming increasingly popular with other legal scholars.

30

The analysis for determining whether to apply comparative negligence
to misuse is essentially the same regardless of which interpretation is
accepted in a particular jurisdiction. The only difference is that the

medically recognizable risk. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402A, comment k.
There is no policy basis for imposing liability here but not in the prior example
where the unknowable risk of ear infection turned out in retrospect to be
reasonable. A reasonable risk that has been inadequately warned against can present as grave a danger to the consumer as the unknowable risk that turns out
upon discovery to be unjustified. In both instances, the manufacturer may be
equally blameless and equally unable to spread the risk.
25. Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 317 (1977); Comment, The Diminishing Role of Negligence in Manufacturers' Liability for Unavoidably Unsafe Drugs and
Cosmetics, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 102 (1977).

26. Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (Nebraska law),
noted in 56 NEB. L. REV. 422 (1977); Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg. Co., 502 S.W.2d
66 (Ky. App. 1973), discussed in Comment, Products Liability: Is § 402A Strict Liability Really Strict in Kentucky?, 62 Ky. L.J. 866 (1974).
27. This is true even though comment k to RESTATEMENT § 402A expressly
applies to all products. It merely uses drugs as a common example. The comment begins with the following statement: "There are some products which, in
the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe

for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of
drugs."
28. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974);
Roach v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974).
29. Keeton, Product Liability and the Automobile, 9 FORUM 1 (1973); Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 834-35 (1973).
30. Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict
Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REV. 803, 829 (1976); Phillips, supra
note 1, at 103, 115-16 (1977); Comment, 10 U.S.F. L. REv., supra note 20.
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manufacturer's knowledge of the danger involved in the use of the product and the availability of technology to eliminate the danger is determined as of the date of manufacture in one case and as of the date of
trial in the other case. Thus, in the lighter fluid example, if consumer
expectations are not violated because the danger is generally known,
there is no liability whatsoever. If consumer expectations are violated,
there is still no liability unless the product is also unreasonably dangerous. The unreasonably dangerous determination is made with hindsight
rather than foresight. The issue is whether, knowing everything that is
known at the time of trial about the dangers of the product and the
technology currently available, the product as formulated is reasonably
safe. If it is, the additional question must be considered of whether a
reasonable person knowing of the danger would have given a different
warning than was actually given by the manufacturer. Assuming that the
product is defective, it is entirely appropriate to apply comparative negligence to the plaintiff's misuse. However, if the product is not defective
the plaintiff should be completely barred. Oregon apparently follows this
approach.3 1
Misuse may also negate the existence of the defect in a third way. In
some cases the plaintiff has no direct evidence of defect. He proves it
circumstantially by showing that the product malfunctioned. Under some
circumstances, this creates an inference that the product is defective.3 2
In such cases, evidence of subsequent alterations in the product or mishandling can prevent the inference from arising because it becomes a
matter of speculation whether the product was defective when it left the
hands of the manufacturer or developed a defect at the time of the
33
misuse.
2. Other Approaches to Determining Defect
A number of other approaches for determining defect have been
used. To a large extent these approaches are variations on the tests for
defect used by the Restatement.
Consumer expectations as sole test of defect
One approach is to resolve all cases by using the consumer expectations test as the sole criteria for determining defectiveness. 34 This test
31. Compare Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033
(1974) with Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265 Ore. 300, 509 P.2d 28 (1973)
in light of the discussion of misuse in Part I of this article.
32. E.g., Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240
(1970).
33. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
34. Manufacturing defects: Maas v. Dreher, 10 Ariz. App. 520, 460 P.2d 191
(1969). Unavoidably unsafe products: Lunt v. Brady Mfg. Corp., 13 Ariz. App.
305, 475 P.2d 964 (1970); Morrow v. Trailmobile, 12 Ariz. App. 578, 473 P.2d
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grants a limited immunity to the manufacturer.3 5 He is free to market
dangerous products, even if the danger feasibly can be eliminated or
reduced, as long as he makes the danger known. 3 6 This test has the
virtue of relieving courts from having to evaluate the reasonableness of
particular designs, 37 a function that one author contends, is beyond the
competency of courts. 3 8 Use of consumer expectations as the sole test
of defect has serious drawbacks which have been fully discussed
39
elsewhere.

In jurisdictions that use consumer expectations as the sole test of defect, the appropriateness of applying comparative negiligence to misuse
depends on whether those expectations have been violated. Referring to
the example of the person injured by lighter fluid when using it to clean
parts, recovery should be completely barred if the danger of being injured by the toxic fumes is generally known. In this situation consumer
expectations have not been violated and the product is not defective. If
the danger is not generally known, then consumer expectations have
been violated and the product is defective. Here applicability of comparative negligence to the plaintiff's conduct is appropriate..
Wade/Keeton hindsight test

Another variation is to reject the consumer expectations test of defect.
While the test remains a major test of defect, 40 an increasing number of
courts have rejected it 41 in selected cases. Typically this occurs in cases
where a bystander is injured by a defective product

42

or where an

employee is required to use an obviously dangerous machine under circumstances where he is likely to injure himself inadvertently. 43 In such
cases, the consumer expectations test sets particularly inappropriate
780 (1970); Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390 (1969).
See Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 470 P.2d 135 (Nev. 1970).
35. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1560 (1973).

36. Id. at 1561.
37. Id. at 1560.
38. Id. at 1557-58.
39. Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339,
348-52 (1974).
40. Henderson, supra note 35, at 1560-61.
41. Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Dorsey
v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir.
1973); Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443

(1972); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr.
629 (1970); Thompson v. Package Mach. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 188, 99 Cal. Rptr.
281 (1972); Brown v. Quick Mix Co., Div. of Koehring Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833,
454 P.2d 205 (1969); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476

P.2d 713 (1970).
42. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr.
629 (1970).
43. Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
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to impose strict liability in view of the
criteria for determining whether
44
policy considerations involved.
In jurisdictions that reject the consumer expectations test, the Wade/
Keeton hindsight test can be the sole test of defect, applying to cases
involving manufacturing defects as well as improper design or warning.45 Obviousness of the danger would still be relevant insofar as it
relates to reasonableness.
In jurisdictions that use the Wade/Keeton Hindsight test as the sole
test of defect, the appropriateness of applying comparative negligence to
misuse depends solely on whether the product is unreasonably dangerous as marketed using hindsight. If it is not unreasonably dangerous the
product is not defective and the plaintiff should be completely barred. If
it is unreasonably dangerous, application of comparative negligence is
appropriate. In the lighter fluid example, the product is defective if in
retrospect a different design or warning should have been adopted.
Consumer Expectations or WadelKeeton Hindsight Test
An alternative approach that has sometimes been taken is to instruct
that the product is defective if it is either unreasonably dangerous under
the Wade/Keeton test or if it contains dangers that a reasonable buyer
would not expect. 46

The use of the two tests in the disjunctive rather

than in the conjunctive produces a significant change. The manufacturer
can be liable for marketing a product containing a reasonable danger if
the danger is unknown. Thus the seller of a new drug which contains a
scientifically unknowable risk of a dangerous side effect would be held
strictly liable to the first individuals who suffer the side effect even if, in
retrospect, the advantages of the drug outweigh the disadvantages so
that its marketing is reasonable. However, as soon as the danger becomes known, the manufacturer will warn against the use of the product. This will preclude imposition of liability in subsequent cases because the warning would prevent a frustration of consumer expectations.
This arbitrarily follows even in cases where the consumer has no practical alternative to taking the drug and thus the warning is of no value in
helping him to avoid the risk.
To determine whether applicability of comparative negligence to an
instance of misuse is appropriate in such a jurisdiction, it is first neces-

44. See Fischer, supra note 39, at 348-52 for a discussion of the drawbacks of
consumer expectations test.
45. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974);
Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and
SYRACUSE L. REv. 559, 568 (1969).
46. Barker v. Lull Eng. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977);
Montgomery & Owen, supra note 30, at 843-45.

Design of Products, 20
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sary to determine whether the product is defective. This can be illustrated again with the lighter fluid example. The product is defective
either if the danger is not generally known or if the danger is unreasonable viewing it in retrospect. Thus if the danger of the toxic fumes is not
generally known, the product is defective and application of comparative
negligence to the misuse is appropriate. Even if the danger is generally
known, the product is still defective, and applicability of comparative
negligence is still appropriate, as long as the product is unreasonably
dangerous as marketed using hindsight. Applicability of comparative
negligence to misuse would only be inappropriate if the danger is generally known and the product is reasonably safe in the way it was designed
and in the way the warnings were given.
Submission of case to jury without guidance
Other jurisdictions have made a complete departure from the Restatement. California led the way by first rejecting the "unreasonably
dangerous" language of the Restatement. 47 California had also rejected
the consumer expectations test. 48 Alaska has now followed California's
lead and similarly rejected both tests of defect. 49 This in effect left such
jurisdictions without any test of defect. 50 Under this scheme the jury is
simply instructed to determine whether the product is "defective." 51
This approach has its drawbacks. It can work well with cases involving
physically flawed products because the common understanding of the
word "defect" includes such products. However, in the case of improper
design or failure to warn, the term "defect" has no natural application,
52
and the jury is left with inadequate guidance.
In recognition of this difficulty the California Supreme Court has recently backed off from its earlier approach of rejecting both tests of defect. It now uses the consumer expectations test and the Wade/Keeton
hindsight test in the disjunctive for cases involving design defects. 53 It
remains to be seen whether Alaska will similarly retreat in view of the
recent California decision.
In jurisdictions that submit the case to the jury without guidance as to
what constitutes a defect, it is normally appropriate to apply comparative
47. Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501
Rptr. 433 (1972).
48. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163,
(1972).
49. Butaud v. Suburban Marine and Sporting Goods,
(Alas. 1975).
50. Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d
605 (1976).
51. Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501
Rptr. 433 (1972).
52. Wade, supra note 29, at 831-33, 838.
53. See text accompanying note 44 supra.

P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
104 Cal. Rptr. 443
Inc., 543 P.2d 209
533, 132 Cal. Rptr.
P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
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negligence to misuse. The misuse in the lighter fluid example is not relevant to the question of whether the product is defective because there is
no requirement that the product either violate consumer expectations or
be unreasonably dangerous.
In deciding to apply comparative negligence to strict liability cases, the
Alaska court ruled that unforeseeable misuse will constitute a basis for
apportioning damages rather than a complete defense. 54 In that jurisdiction, this is a desirable approach. Since Alaska has no test of what
constitutes a defect, misuse will normally 55 not be relevant to negating
the existence of defect. Thus, unless it prevents the plaintiff from proving causation, 56 it can only be relevant to the question of contributory
negligence, assuming that a misuse is unreasonable.
3. Foreseeable and Unforeseeable Misuse
It is often said that only unforeseeable misuse will cut off liability of a
manufacturer. 57 This is not literally true. While a manufacturer is liable
for some foreseeable misuses, such as standing on a chair, 58 he is clearly
not liable for all foreseeable misuses. Foreseeability in isolation is not the
test.
There are some situations where foreseeable misuse will cut off liability. For example, it is foreseeable to anybody who watches television that
beverage bottles are sometimes used as weapons, but such bottles are not
defective for the reasons discussed above. Also, no warning is required
here because the hazards of using a bottle in such a way are obvious.
A foreseeable failure to follow directions will likewise not always result
in liability. Surely it is foreseeable to tire manufacturers that users sometimes fail to keep the prescribed amount of air pressure in their tires. It
is also foreseeable that this constitutes a serious hazard. However, it may
not be possible to make a tire that is safe for use when greatly overinflated or greatly under-inflated. Therefore, the manufacturer is relieved from liability as long as he gives an adequate warning. 59 He is
entitled to "reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded." 60
Likewise, not all unforeseeable misuse will cut off liability. Suppose the
plaintiff purchases a pickup truck which has a defective steering
mechanism. While in the course of using the pickup truck as a taxi cab,
the vehicle fails to steer properly and an accident results. Plaintiff is
54. Butaud v. Suburban Marine and Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alas.
1976).

55. In cases where the only evidence of defect is circumstantial, misuse may
prevent the inference of defect from arising.
56. Part II .B, infra.
57. Noel, supra note 3, at 96-98; Note, supra note 3, at 198.
58. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 173-74.

59. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402A, comment k.
60. Id., comment j.
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seriously injured. Use of the vehicle as a taxi cab is an unforeseeable
abnormal use because the manufacturer would not have contemplated
such a use. The misuse is also a cause in fact of the accident in the sense
that the plaintiff would not have been injured if he had been using a
different vehicle for transporting his passengers. Yet this misuse does
not prevent the imposition of liability. The product was defective, and
the defect was the proximate cause of the harm to the plaintiff. Furthermore, contributory fault is no defense because plaintiff's conduct
was entirely reasonable.
The analysis for determining the effect of misuse is the same regardless of whether the misuse is foreseeable or unforeseeable. One must
first determine whether the misuse negates an element of plaintiff's case
with reference to the scheme of strict liability in force in the jurisdiction
in question. If not, one must determine whether the conduct constitutes
an affirmative defense recognized in that jurisdiction.
B. Negating Proximate Cause
Misuse may also have relevance in resolving questions of proximate
cause. Suppose in the case where plaintiff used the soda bottle as a container for burying his money, the freezing and thawing of the ground
broke the bottle because of a pre-existing flaw in the glass. A sound
bottle would not have broken under such conditions. Here the bottle is
clearly defective and unreasonably dangerous because of the risk that it
might explode and injure someone in the vicinity. Yet it is unlikely that
the court would hold the defendant liable when an entirely different
hazard (moisture) materializes. 6 ' Under other strict liability theories
courts have usually taken a restrictive view of proximate cause, limiting
recovery to harm resulting from the risk that led to the imposition of
62
strict liability.
C. Misuse as an Affirmative Defense
Misuse which does not negate an element of plaintiff's case is relevant
only insofar as it constitutes an affirmative defense. In a given case misuse may be reasonable or unreasonable. It also sometimes involves a voluntary encountering of a known risk and sometimes does not. These
factors are important in determining whether contributory negligence,
assumption of the risk, or both are present. Courts differ with respect to
which of these defenses they recognize in strict liability cases. Thus, each
allegation of misuse must be closely scrutinized to determine whether it
qualifies as an affirmative defense.
61. Note, Torts-Proximate Cause in Strict Liability Cases, 50 N.C. L. REv. 714,
715, 717, 722 (1972).
62. Id. See also Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 44 Wash. 2d 440, 268 P.2d 645
(1954) (no liability for a blasting operation which caused mother mink to eat her
young).
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ASSUMPTION OF THE RisK

A. Nature of the Defense
Assumption of the risk can be either express or implied. Implied assumption of the risk occurs if the plaintiff knows of the risk that defendant has created and voluntarily encounters it anyway.6 3 Express conwhen plaintiff agrees to relieve
tractual assumption of the risk occurs
64
defendant from liability in advance.
Assumption of the risk may be either reasonable or unreasonable depending on the plaintiff's reason for encountering the risk.6 5 If comparative negligence is applied to assumption of the risk, reasonable assumption of the risk would not diminish the plaintiff's recovery because
he is guilty of no fault.66 Unreasonable assumption of the risk would
diminish the plaintiff's recovery exactly as would contributory negligence.
It is not clear which of the various forms of assumption of the risk are
recognized by the Restatement. It clearly recognizes unreasonable assumption of the risk as a complete defense. 67 The Restatement does
not address itself to the question of whether a reasonable assumption of
the risk should be a defense. This involves the situation where the plaintiff voluntarily encounters a known risk, but is not contributorily negligent because the interest he is protecting is sufficiently important to
make the encountering of the risk reasonable. The Restatement also
does not address the question of whether express contractual assumption
of the risk is a defense. It is clear that such an agreement is normally
effective between the parties unless the agreement is inconsistent with
68
public policy.
It would be inaccurate to assume that all forms of assumption of the
risk should be treated in the same manner under comparative negligence. The term assumption of the risk includes a broad range of conduct, some of which should perhaps be an absolute defense to a strict
liability action and other instances of which should be no defense at all.
Still other conduct may be appropriately recognized as a partial defense
under comparative negligence. The appropriate treatment must be divined from an analysis of each jurisdiction's policy and specific form of
strict products liability imposed.

63. Comment, Torts: Comparative Negligence + Implied Assumption of
Risk = Injustice, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 549, 550 (1974).
64. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REV. 122,
124 (1961).
65. Id. at 133.
66. Schwartz, Li v. Yellow Cab Company: A Survey of California Practice Under
Comparative Negligence, 7 PAc. L.J. 747, 756 (1976).
67. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402A, comment n.
68. Keeton, supra note 64, at 134-35.
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B. Policy Considerations
The most common policy justification for recognition of the assumption of the risk defense is that it constitutes a form of consent. If this is
true it should be a complete bar to recovery in negligence actions just as
consent is a bar in actions for intentional tort recovery. 69 In fact, the
consent analogy is valid for some forms of assumption of the risk but
not for others. This becomes clear when the policy bases for making
consent an absolute defense to intentional torts are evaluated.
70
No wrong occurs to one who is willing that an interest be invaded. 7 1
Technically, consent is not an affirmative defense to intentional torts.
Thus, one who agrees to fly in an airplane has not been falsely imprisoned because the confinement has not been against his will, an essential
a batelement of the tort.7 2 One who agrees to a kiss has not suffered
73
tery because no harmful or offensive contact has occurred.
For policy reasons the same rationale is applied to some cases where
harm is inflicted. If plaintiff agrees to a surgical operation, a harm does
occur in the sense that the incision is a "harmful contact." 74 Yet consent prevents the imposition of liability for battery because the decision
was made that the benefits conferred by the operation would most likely
outweigh its harmful effects. In our society the power to make that decision is conferred upon the patient rather than upon some outside
agency such as the government. The theory is that the person involved is
better able to make a decision in his own best interest than would be the
government.75 The surgeon might refuse to operate if he knew that the
plaintiff could change his mind after the operation and hold the surgeon
liable for battery.7 6 Failure to recognize consent as a defense would
frustrate the policy of conferring the decision-making power on the
plaintiff because defendent would be inhibited from acting in response

69. E.g., Polelle, supra note 20, at 132; Wade, Crawford & Ryder, supra note
1, at 454, 460.

70. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 18.
71. 1 F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 3.10 (1956); W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 18; Bohlen, Consent as Affecting Civil Liabilityfor Breaches of the
Peace, 24 COLUm. L. REV. 819 (1924); Carpenter, Intentional Invasion of Interest of
Personality (pt. 2), 13 ORE. L. REV. 275, 282 (1934); Comment, Consent in Tort
Actions, 3 Mo. L. REV. 44 (1938); Note, 24 MARQ. L. REv. 108 (1940); Note, 8
OKLA. L. REV. 117, 118 (1955). See Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 172 Pa. Super.
271, 94 A.2d 74 (1953). However, some courts treat the issue as an affirmative

defense. They place the burden of proof on the defendant. Note, 8 OKLA. L.
REV. 117, 118 (1955). See, e.g., Sims v. Alford, 218 Ala. 216, 118 So. 395 (1928).
72. Herring v. Boyle, 1 Cr. M. & R. 377, 149 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Ex. 1834).
73. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §§ 15, 19.
74. Id. at § 15.
75. Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REV. 17, 23-24

(1961).
76. Id. at 25.
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to the plaintiff's choice."
In order to encourage individuals to act in
response to free choices by others the law goes one step further by mak78
ing apparent consent a bar to recovery.
Whether comparative negligence should be applied to assumption of
the risk depends upon the extent to which the consent analogy is valid.
Thus if assumption of the risk prevents a wrong from occurring or if it
needs to be recognized in order to encourage people to act in response
to free choices made by others it should be an absolute defense. Otherwise it should either be a basis for mitigating damages under comparative negligence, or it should be no defense at all.
Where the consent analogy is valid there is no basis for distinguishing
between reasonable and unreasonable assumption of risk. If reasonable
consent is an absolute defense then unreasonable consent should also be
an absolute defense. Application of comparative negligence to unreasonable assumption of the risk merely rewards the plaintiff for his own misconduct by permitting him a partial recovery; he would have been barred completely had he been acting reasonably.
C. Express Assumption of the Risk
Express assumption of the risk bears the closest relationship to consent
to intentional torts. Plaintiff agrees to relieve defendant from liability in
advance. Recognition of the defense obviously encourages defendants to
act in response to the plaintiff's choice; removing the spectre of potential liability can free a producer to give the consumer what he wants.
Express assumption of the risk is normally recognized as an absolute
defense unless the agreement is barred as being inconsistent with public
policy, in which case it is no defense at all.7 9 In products liability litigation such agreements frequently take the form of disclaimers, and in
many cases are not recognized. 80 It is obviously desirable that some "as
is" sales be permitted in society. Consequently there will be situations
when the agreement is valid and will be upheld. Courts have not applied
comparative negligence concepts to express assumption of the risk.8"
D. Implied Assumption of the Risk
Implied assumption of the risk is not analogous to consent in the sense
that no wrong occurs as a result of plaintiff's conduct. Assume plaintiff
uses a punch press knowing it has an inadequate safety guard. He is
77.
78.
1972).
79.
80.
(1960).

Id.
Id. at 25-26;

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 892 (Tent. Draft No. 18,

Keeton, supra note 64, at 134-35, 137-38.
E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69

81. V.

SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §

9.2 (1974).
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injured as a result. The defendant manufacturer's conduct in designing
the safety guard is wrongful because the assumption of risk took place
only after the defendant's breach of duty, i.e., after defendant marketed
the defective product, plaintiff discovered the risk and voluntarily encountered it. Clearly a wrong occurred to the plaintiff. He did not consent to suffer the harm, but merely to encounter the risk of the harm
occurring. Furthermore, he did not agree to hold the defendant harmless in the event that the risk should materialize. 82 Thus this is really
not analogous to the alleged battery where the plaintiff agrees to be
kissed. In that case no battery occurred because the kiss was neither an
offensive nor a harmful touching to the plaintiff. In the punch press
case the plaintiff suffered a harm that he hoped would not occur and
which would have been avoided if the defendant's product had not been
defective.
The only justification for barring plaintiff's recovery in such a case is
to advance the policy of encouraging people to act in response to free
choices of others. This justification would almost never exist in products
liability cases involving implied assumption of the risk. Such cases involve
products that are generally dangerous and equally likely to injure people
who have not discovered the risk. Discovery of the risk by the plaintiff
prior to injury is merely fortuitous from the point of view of the defendant. He cannot know in advance whether the victim will turn out to be
a person who discovered the risk. He is motivated to assume that the
potential victim will not have discovered the risk to guard against potential liability. Therefore, recognition of the defense serves no useful purpose from the point of view of inducing appropriate conduct by the
3
defendant.
The consent analogy is so imperfect that it is obviously not the true
policy basis of implied assumption of the risk. The most likely explanation is that the defense was contrived as an arbitrary bar to recovery at a
time when emerging industry needed protection. 4 Because industry is
now sufficiently well established that it no longer needs this protection,
one might expect the defense to cease to be recognized. In fact, the
trend in this country is away from recognition of reasonable assumption
85
of the risk as a defense.
Since consent is not the basis of implied assumption of the risk, it need
not be recognized as an absolute bar to recovery. Rather, it is appropriate to apply comparative negligence to assumption of the risk. Of
course reasonable assumption of the risk will not reduce the plaintiff's

82. Id. at § 9.1.
83. Mansfield, supra note 75, at 71-72.
84. E.g., V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 81, § 9.1.
85. McNichols, supra note I, at 389; Comment, Colorado Comparative Negligence and Assumption of risk, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 509, 527-28 (1975).
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recovery under comparative negligence because he has not been at fault;
to the extent that the plaintiff's conduct is unreasonable, it should
merely be treated as contributory negligence and be used to mitigate
86
damages.
E. Negating Elements of Plaintiff's Case
In situations where assumption of the risk is used to express the conclusion that the product is not defective, it should remain an absolute
defense. As discussed earlier, many courts use the consumer expectations test of defect. 87 In effect, this distinguishes between obvious or
generally known hazards and latent or unknown hazards. This is essentially the same distinction that has long been employed to limit the duty
of landowners towards people who enter the premises. Injuries caused
by obvious hazards do not give rise to liability. One way of expressing
this is to say that there is "no duty" and thus the landowner has not been
negligent in failing to correct the dangerous condition. An alternative
approach is to say that entrants assume the risk of all obvious
hazards. 88 This is different from implied assumption of the risk because the plaintiff is not required to know of the hazard or voluntarily
encounter it. Assumption of the risk has generally not been used in this
sense in products liability cases.8 9 However, if it is used in this sense in
a jurisdiction that applies comparative negligence to strict liability cases,
it is clear the damages should not be apportioned. Under such circumstances the plaintiff has not proven that the product is defective
since the consumer expectations test has not been violated.
In jurisdictions that accept the consumer expectations test of defect, a
related question arises. Should implied assumption of the risk constitute
an absolute defense? In such jurisdictions the limited duty of the manufacturer is to disclose the risk involved in his product. Should not the
plaintiff who has independently acquired this information concerning a
latent defect also be absolutely barred?
The answer depends on the underlying basis for the consumer expectations test. Professor Henderson suggests that the virtue of the consumer expectations test is that it protects courts from having to determine the reasonableness of product designs, a task of which they are
incapable. 90 If this were true and were the only factor involved, it
would point toward recognition of assumption of the risk as an absolute
defense. However, Professor Henderson argues that the consumer ex-

86. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 81, § 9.5.
87. See Part II, supra.
88. Keeton, supra note 64.
89. Henderson, supra note 35.

90. Id. at 1560.
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pectations test has the additional virtue of relegating to the marketplace
the question of how much safety must be designed into a specific product. 9 1 The test requires manufacturers either to produce products
with only obvious hazards or to give a warning. Consumers thus informed will avoid purchasing products that are unduly dangerous on the
one hand or that have unreasonably expensive or cumbersome safety
devices on the other. This function of the marketplace to make decisions
concerning product safety may be subverted in the implied assumption
of the risk situation where the defect is discovered only after the purchase has been made. Where this occurs the product should be deemed
defective since the function of the consumer expectations test has not
been fully accomplished. Liability should be imposed subject to mitigation of damages in accordance with the degree of the plaintiff's fault.
Sometimes assumption of the risk can negate the element of causation.
Suppose the defendant's only duty under the circumstances is to give a
warning and the plaintiff independently discovers what would have been
disclosed by the warning. Here his encountering of the risk cuts off the
defendant's liability because he cannot prove that a warning would have
prevented the harm. 92 This is true at least unless the evidence shows
that the product would not have been purchased in the first place had
an appropriate warning been given. Obviously assumption of the risk
should be a complete defense here rather than a basis for apportioning
damages since an element of the plaintiff's case is missing. Thus, even if
a bystander is injured, assumption of the risk by the person using the
product under these circumstances would cut off the bystander's right to
recover damages.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Jurisdictions electing to apply comparative negligence to strict liability
must decide the extent to which it will apply to various forms of misuse
and assumption of the risk. This determination could vary greatly from
state to state because of differences in the nature of strict liability imposed. The law in each jurisdiction must be carefully analyzed to determine the appropriate role of comparative negligence in that jurisdiction.
This is especially true with regard to misuse. There are at least six
distinct systems for determining if a product is defective:
1. Consumer expectations test only;
2. Consumer expectations test plus negligence in design and
warning cases;
3. Consumer expectations test plus Wade/Keeton hindsight test;
4. Consumer expectations test or Wade/Keeton hindsight test;
5. Wade/Keeton hindsight test as sole test of defect; and
6. Submission of case to jury without guidance.
91. Id.
92. Keeton, supra note 64, at 145-46.
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Whether comparative negligence should be applied to a specific instance of misuse depends on which of the above schemes for determining defectiveness is used. The definition of defect adopted by a particular jurisdiction will determine whether the concept of misuse can be relevant to the existence of a defect. The consumer expectations test of
defect is widely accepted, and misuse sometimes establishes that those
expectations are not disappointed (use of soda bottle as a hammer). In
jurisdictions that accept the Restatement requirement that the product
be "unreasonably dangerous" as an element of defect, misuse can sometimes negate this element (use of soda bottle to bury money). In jurisdictions where misuse is not relevant to the question of defectiveness, it
may be relevant, if at all, only insofar as it constitutes an affirmative
defense. Here applicability of comparative negligence is entirely appropriate.
Ideally the term misuse need never be used. In jurisdictions where
'there is a test of defect the instruction should clearly require the jury to
find all elements of the plaintiff's case before resolving the problem of
damage apportionment. If the plaintiff has made a submissible case and
if there is evidence of a recognized affirmative defense, the jury should
be told to reduce the plaintiff's recovery in accordance with the degree
of his fault. Here the issues are dealt with in terms of defect, causation,
and contributory negligence. The term misuse is unduly confusing because it can be used to refer to all three concepts. This creates the
danger that the burden of proof on an issue will be placed on the wrong
party or that in a given case the plaintiff may be permitted to recover
even though he cannot establish an element of his case.
The proper role of assumption of the risk in a comparative negligence
jurisdiction depends largely on the policy basis for the defense. If assumption of the risk is a defense analogous to consent to intentional
torts then it should remain an absolute defense even in a comparative
negligence jurisdiction. If the assumption of the risk is express, the consent analogy is particularly appropriate and the defense should certainly
be absolute.
The consent analogy is not appropriate in most cases of implied assumption of the risk. Here, applicability of comparative negligence is
appropriate. It is therefore appropriate to diminish the plaintiff's recovery in accordance with his fault whenever his assumption of the risk is
unreasonable. Reasonable assumption of the risk will have no effect on
the plaintiff's ability to recover. In view of this result there is no longer
any reason to distinguish between contributory negligence and implied
assumption of the risk. All cases can be dealt with in terms of contributory negligence.
It is possible for assumption of the risk to be used as a way of describing a failure of the plaintiff to prove an element of his case, either defect or causation. When used in this sense assumption of the risk should
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be a complete bar to recovery rather than a basis for diminishing the
plaintiff's recovery.
Products liability is still in its infancy, and the definition of defect will
continue to evolve. The decision whether to impose strict liability involves policy questions of great importance, and it is unlikely that any
single word formula can mechanically be applied to all cases to reach
consistently satisfactory results. The appropriate role of comparative
negligence in a given jurisdiction will have to be reevaluated with each
stage in the evolution of the law of products liability.
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